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DECENTRALISING WAGE BARGAINING IN GERMANY 






The area-wide wage agreement is at the centre of Germany’s system of collective bargaining. 
In recent years, however, there has been a tendency towards the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining. Individual wage agreements have led to more moderate wage developments, 
whilst wage agreements with individual firms, and agreements at the production unit level 
have not had this moderating effect. On the other hand, collective bargaining has become 
more flexible. The further decentralisation of collective bargaining gives rise to objections 
based in constitutional law and to the resistance of employees and (in part) also of employers. 





















1. Introduction   
 
In May 2003 there were 4.3 million persons officially declared to be unemployed in 
Germany. This is an unemployment rate of 10.5 percent. Labour cost developments 
have been singled out as being the principal cause of this high unemployment. Wage 
agreements have not shown sufficient moderation, there is not enough differentiation 
between wage rates for different types of labour services, and not enough wage 
flexibility. The evolution of wages has been attributed amongst other things to the wage 
bargaining system in Germany. 
 
Following Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Calmfors (1993), wage bargaining systems 
can be classified according to whether they are conducted at the macroeconomic level, 
the sectoral level or the level of the individual enterprise. Traxler et al. (2001) object 
that the degree of centralisation is not sufficient to characterise wage bargaining systems 
adequately. In their view, it is necessary to take into account whether the wage 
negotiations are coordinated, and if there is coordination, what form it takes. In this 
context one should distinguish between horizontal and vertical coordination. Horizontal 
coordination aims at synchronizing wage bargaining across branches and trades. 
Besides the wage negotiations carried out by the umbrella organisations (i.e. employers 
association and trade union), at the central level there may be coordination between 
members of the umbrella organisations, as well as participation of the state in wage 
bargaining. What is more, sectoral wage settlements may be oriented to the results in a 
leading sector, which represents another element of coordination (pattern bargaining). 
Vertical coordination is directed at passing down the results obtained at a central level 
to lower levels (e.g. individual enterprises or production units) (Moene et al. 1993). 
 
In the German wage bargaining system, it is usually the metal-working industry that 
exercises a leading role. Here negotiations begin as a rule in the area of North 
Württemberg and North Baden, where such successful enterprises as Daimler-Chrysler, 
Porsche and others are located. The wage settlement obtained for this area of the 
country and this sector of the economy provides an orientation mark for wage   3
negotiations in virtually all other branches and regions. Legal provisions together with 
the structure of employers associations both work together to bring about a strong 
integration of the individual enterprise in sectoral wage bargaining. Nevertheless, at the 
level of the enterprise, collective wage agreements are also concluded.  
 
Recent years have seen a decentralisation of wage bargaining in Germany. Area-wide 
collective wage agreements (Flächentarifverträge) are no longer as important as they 
once were, whilst company-wide collective wage agreements [Firmentarifverträge], 
wage agreements at the plant level [Betriebsvereinbarungen], as well as individual 
wage contracts have gained in importance. This decentralisation is due to changes in the 
basic conditions of the economy connected with globalisation, with new forms of 
organisation of work, etc. The decline in the power of trade unions, which prefer the 
area-wide wage agreement, has contributed to this development. In addition, in the face 
of step-wise growing unemployment, the scientific community increasingly has called 
for decentralisation of wage bargaining (Council of Economic Advisors, various years). 
There have also been recommendations that an end to union scales as a basis for labour 
remuneration would be desirable and would contribute to increasing employment.  
 
The question is whether a decentralisation of wage bargaining would increase 
employment in Germany. In order to answer this question it is necessary not only to 
examine the effects of a decentralisation on wage developments. At the same time, it is 
also necessary to look at the productivity effects that such a reform would bring about. 
Apart from the efficiency analysis, it is also important to discuss whether the proposed 
decentralisation is in the interest of the enterprises, the employees, and their respective 
organisations. In addition, in evaluating the chances of achieving decentralisation, one 
must take into account the power position of the employers associations and of the trade 
unions, and hence their opportunities to resist such a decentralisation. Then too, the 
question must be addressed whether constitutional norms are opposed to 
decentralisation. But before turning to these questions, the German wage bargaining 
system will be described and the erosion of its most important component, the area-
wide collective wage agreement, will be discussed. 
   4
2.  The German System of Wage Bargaining 
 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the freedom of collective bargaining 
(Tarifautonomie) obtains. Trade unions, on the one hand, and employers associations or 
individual enterprises, on the other, negotiate and agree upon binding contracts that 
regulate labour remuneration and other conditions of employment. The legal basis of the 
freedom of collective bargaining is article 9, paragraph 3 of the German Constitution 
together with the Collective Agreements Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz). Contracts between a 
trade union and an employers association are referred to as area-wide collective wage 
agreements. They are for the most part made at the regional level and for individual 
branches of the economy. If a trade union and an individual enterprise are the collective 
bargaining parties, then it is referred to as a company-wide collective wage agreement. 
At the end of 2002, 7063 enterprises had entered into 24,542 company-wide collective 
wage agreements. At the same time there were 32,782 area-wide collective wage 
agreements (Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour 2003). 
 
A collective wage agreement is legally binding when the employing enterprise is either 
a member of an association, or a party in its own right to such an agreement, and when 
the employee is a member of the trade union which is a party to the agreement. If the 
agreement is declared to be generally binding by the competent ministry, then it applies 
to all employees of the enterprise irrespective of their membership in the trade union 
and to all enterprises irrespective of their membership in an association (according to 
the scope of the extension). And finally, the binding nature of the contract can be agreed 
upon individually between employer and employee. This is usually done by employers 
who are members of the contracting association with respect to their employees who are 
not members of the trade union concerned. For employment which is subject to a 
collective wage agreement, the wages agreed upon – the so-called union scales – 
represent the minimum remuneration. 
 
The collective wage agreement continues in effect even after an enterprise gives up its 
membership in the employers association. The Collective Agreements Act lays down 
that the binding nature of the collective wage agreement is not affected by the employer 
leaving the association, but remains in force until the agreement expires. Thereafter, the 
legal norms of the agreement continue in force until a new agreement is reached. 
However, the collective wage agreement is deprived of its obligatory effect, so that the 
possibility of contractual arrangements affecting the employment relationship to the 
detriment of the employee are opened up (Brox and Rüthers 2002).   5
According to the Collective Agreements Act, deviations from the collective wage 
agreement are only allowed when the modification is to the advantage of the employee, 
e. g. when a remuneration is agreed upon that is higher than the union scale (so-called 
principle of advantage [Günstigkeitsprinzip]), or when the collective wage agreement 
contains an ‘opt-out clause’ (Öffnungsklausel). In most cases, such ‘opt-out clauses’ 
give the parties at the level of the individual enterprise or the individual production unit 
authority to settle such questions in the context of an agreement at the plant level, that is 
to say an agreement between management and the representative body of the employees 
(the works council). Basically, one can distinguish four categories of ‘opt-out clauses’: 
 
  Hardship clauses (Härtefallklauseln): such clauses provide that the employer and 
the works council can apply to the collective bargaining parties for permission to 
negotiate a special contract in order to prevent an impending insolvency, to preserve 
jobs, or to improve the chances of restoring the economic viability of the enterprise. 
  ‘Opt-out clauses’ conditioned on approval by the collective bargaining parties: such 
contractual clauses open up the possibility for an agreement at the plant level which 
deviates from the collective wage agreement, but such deviating agreements do not 
become valid without the consent of the collective bargaining parties. 
  ‘Opt-out clauses’ without such a condition which provide for the possibility of 
agreement at the plant level without the requirement of consent by the collective 
bargaining parties. 
  Clauses permitting exceptions to small production units allowing individual 
contractual arrangements between employer and employee providing for 
remuneration below union scale as fixed in the collective wage agreement (Schnabel 
2000). 
Contractual ‘opt-out clauses’ applying to remuneration have begun to play a more 
important role since the middle of the 1990s; they make it possible to take into account 
the interests of individual enterprises or production units. Such arrangements at the 
plant level must be voluntarily agreed upon by management and works councils and 
coercive measures such as strike or lock-out are not permitted. 
 
Absent contractual ‘opt-out clauses’, questions bearing on remuneration or working 
conditions in general which are either settled in the collective wage agreement or, 
although not settled, would normally be settled in the collective wage agreement, cannot 
be the object of agreements at the plant level (§ 77, section 3 of the Industrial   6
Constitution Act [Betriebsverfassungsgesetz]). Even an enterprise that is not a party to a 
collective wage agreement cannot negotiate with its works council on wage rates, since 
these lie in the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining parties, i. e. the employers 
association and the trade union (barrier to regulatory activity - Regelungssperre). (Such 
an enterprise can, however, negotiate wage agreements with individual employees.) 
 
 
3.  The External Erosion of the Area-wide Collective Wage Agreements 
 
The relevance of area-wide collective wage agreements is determined by the degree to 
which they have a binding effect on the remuneration of labour or on working 
conditions. The proportion of production units or of employees whose remuneration or 
other working conditions are regulated by collective wage agreements (collective 
bargaining coverage) sheds light on this question. 
 
The collective bargaining coverage can be evaluated based on data taken from the panel 
of production units maintained by the Institute for Employment Research of the Federal 
Employment Services (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). The panel is made up of a permanent 
group of participants taken from production units from all branches of the economy 
having at least one employee subject to social security contributions. Participants are 
requested to supply information and the panel results are projected on the economy as a 
whole on the basis of employment data. 
 
In 2002, just 44 percent of West German production units were subject to area-wide 
collective wage agreements, while only 20 percent of East German production units 
were subject to such agreements. The highest proportion of production units subject to 
such wage agreements were to be found in the following branches: territorial and social 
security authorities; mining and power production; construction industry; and banking 
and insurance. For almost three percent of production units in the Länder of the former 
Federal Republic, and five and a half percent of production units in the new Länder, 
company-wide collective wage agreements applied (table 1). 
 
If one looks at the figures for employees (instead of production units), the extent to 
which collective wage agreements apply is larger in each case. In 2002, around 63 
percent of West German employees and 43 percent of East German employees worked 
in a production unit which was subject to an area-wide collective wage agreement. For 
nearly eight percent of West German employees and just under twelve percent of East 
German employees, a company-wide collective wage agreement applied (table 1).   7
 
Table 1: 




Collective wage agreement 
Employees 
Collective wage agreement 
Area-wide Company-wide Area-wide  Company-wide
 
Branch 
West East West East West  East West East 
Agriculture,  etc.  45.0 11.3 1.7  0.8 58.8  21.3 2.4  5.2 
Mining/Power Production  52.3  ··  9.3  ··  66.7  ··  27.0  ·· 
Primary  industries  46.7 21.6 3.3  5.3 71.6  39.4 7.3 14.8 
Investment  goods  38.4 17.4 2.7  4.2 64.9  29.8 9.1 13.2 
Consumer  goods  53.9 21.6 2.3  3.3 69.8  33.1 6.0 10.4 
Construction industry  66.2  26.9 0.8  4.1 79.1  35.4 2.1  9.6 
Commerce/Repair  46.8 19.7 1.6  3.3 63.6  35.5 4.1  5.6 
Transport/Communication 30.7  9.1  9.0 5.1  50.8  24.6  14.6  36.1 
Banking/Insurance  59.9 26.7 1.2  2.1 86.4  81.6 4.7  4.1 
Services for enterprise  16.8  12.1  0.4  4.4  30.6  34.9  4.0  7.6 
Other  services  45.5 16.3 2.7  4.3 60.7  43.3 7.8 12.0 
Non-profit organisations  50.7  42.2 5.3 13.2  56.3  30.7  10.6 21.2 
Territorial/Soc. Security 
authorities 
83.0 87.9 9.9  5.9 86.3  90.7 9.9  8.5 
Total  44.1 20.2 2.4  4.2 62.9  42.7 7.1 11.8 
a Share of the production units/employees subject to collective wage agreements in percent. 
 
Source:  Institute for Employment Research, Panel of Production Units, Survey 10 West, 
Survey 7 East, 2002. 
 
 
The fact that both in West and in East Germany the proportion of employees subject to 
an area-wide collective wage agreement is greater than that of the production units 
points to a situation in which larger production units are more likely to be subject to an 
area-wide or a company-wide agreement. This is confirmed by the figures presented in 
table 2, which show that both area-wide and company-wide agreements apply more 
frequently to medium and large size enterprises than to small enterprises. 
   8
Table 2: 




Area-wide agreement  Company-wide agreement  Employees 
(on 30 June 2002)  West East West East 
1 to 9  39.4  16.2  1.7  2.7 
10 to 49  54.8  30.0  3.5  7.9 
50 to 199  62.6  46.4  7.4  15.4 
200 to 499  70.1  60.9  11.7  18.7 
500 or more  82.1  72.2  9.1  18.7 
Total 44.1  20.2  2.4  4.2 
a Proportion of production units for which the wage agreement applies, in percent. 
 
Source:  Institute for Employment Research, Panel of Production Units, Survey 10 West, 
Survey 7 East, 2002. 
 
 
Econometric studies have shown that the probability that an area-wide collective wage 
agreement will be applicable is larger when the production unit has existed for a longer 
period and when it does not have the legal form of a proprietorship or partnership, in 
which the principal (or principals) has (have) the desire to intervene personally in fixing 
the remuneration of their employees. Other variables that have an influence are the   
union density and the existence of a works council. In production units in which highly 
qualified employees predominate, the remuneration of each employee will typically be 
fixed in an individual contract between employee and employer. Such employees do not 
as a rule see trade unions as adequate representatives of their interests and production 
units with a large proportion of such employees will seldom be subject to a collective 
wage agreement. If, however, skilled workers with a high degree of unionisation 
characterise the production unit, then it is more likely to be subject to a collective wage 
agreement (Franz and Pfeiffer 2001; Kohaut and Schnabel 2003). 
 
The application of area-wide collective wage agreements in Germany shows a clear 
downward tendency. A number of factors may have contributed to this external erosion 
of area-wide wage agreements. As a result of the globalisation of the economy it is no 
longer so important to establish equality of competitive conditions at the national level 
for enterprises through area-wide wage agreements. On the contrary, enterprises need 
sufficient wage flexibility in order to be able to meet foreign competition. Furthermore,   9
new and more differentiated forms of organising work require possibilities to vary 
remuneration at the level of the production unit. In order to avoid being subject to area-
wide collective wage agreements, more and more enterprises leave the employers 
associations, or do not join them in the first place. The decline in union density also 
contributes to the loss of importance of area-wide wage agreements. And finally, 
structural changes, in which sectors covered by collective wage agreements lose ground 
to those sectors in which such agreements are less likely to apply, also contribute to the 
erosion of area-wide collective wage agreements. 
 
The data taken from the panel maintained by the Institute for Employment Research 
also indicate a decline in the importance of area-wide collective wage agreements. For 
West Germany, these data go back to 1995, and for East Germany to 1996. In West 
Germany, in 1995 72.2 percent of employees were subject to an area-wide wage 
agreement, in 2002 this proportion had declined to 62.9 percent. In East Germany, a 
decline from 56.3 percent in 1996 to 42.7 percent in 2002 has been registered (cf. Figure 
1). Looking at production units, the decline in units subject to area-wide wage 
agreements amounted to almost nine percentage points in West Germany and five and a 
half percentage points in East Germany. The shrinking importance of wage agreements 
covering entire branches of the economy is only one dimension of the erosion of area-
wide collective wage agreements; there is also an internal erosion which reinforces the 
tendencies which have just been described. 
 
 
4.  The Internal Erosion of Area-wide Collective Wage Agreements 
 
Whilst the external erosion of the importance of area-wide collective wage agreements 
has been measured with reference to their formal relevance for the remuneration of 
labour, the concept of the internal erosion of such agreements refers to their decreasing 
relevance of standards laid down in area-wide collective wage agreements as a way of 
shaping or standardising working conditions in areas in which such agreements are 
binding on production units. One can distinguish between two forms of internal erosion 
of area-wide wage agreements: contractual flexibilisation and breach of contract. 
Deviations from the formally valid norms of the wage agreement which have not been 
imposed unilaterally by management, but which have been the object of (re-)negotiation 
within the production unit, represent measures of contractual flexibilisation. The 
collective bargaining parties may or may not participate directly in the negotiations 
leading to such flexibilisation agreements. One may speak of breach of contract when a 
production unit is in a legal sense subject to a collective agreement, but the management   10
unilaterally, though with some implicit support by employees, decides not to observe 
the norms laid down in that agreement (Artus 2001, pp. 111 ff. and 125 ff.). 
 
Figure 1: 












1995 1996 1998 2002
%
West Germany East Germany
a Share of employees subject to collective wage agreements in percent.
Source: Institute for Employment Research, Panel of Production Units, var. surveys.
 
 
Although the collective bargaining parties exercise a considerable influence in cases of 
flexibilisation agreed upon by them, this type of flexibilisation, nevertheless, contributes 
to an erosion of the system of area-wide wage agreements. There are two approaches to 
this kind of flexibilisation: making use of ‘opt-out clauses’ and – as already mentioned 
above – the conclusion of company-wide collective wage agreements. Contractual ‘opt-
out clauses’ have become rather wide-spread in Germany. There are very few wage-
settlement areas in which ‘opt-out clauses’ have not been agreed upon. The survey of 
works and personnel councils carried out by the WSI
1 showed that in 2002 35 percent of 
the production units and 22 percent of state authorities made use of contractual ‘opt-out 
clauses’. In 1999/2000, only 22 percent of the production units took advantage of them. 
                                                 
1   The survey of works and personnel councils carried out by the Economic and Social Science Institute 
(Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut [WSI]) in the Hans Böckler Foundation collects 
and analyses information obtained from members of works councils in production units, and from 
members of personnel councils in state authorities; production units and government authorities 
employing more than 20 persons in all areas of the economy and in all branches of government are  
surveyed. In West Germany more than 46 percent of these units have a council, in East Germany the 
parallel figure is 40 percent. The survey was carried out in 1997/98, 1999/2000 and 2002.   11
These clauses have been applied mainly with respect to the regulation of working hours. 
But with respect to questions of pay they were also referred to in no less than one-sixth 
of the production units and government offices. The exceptions often took the form of 
lower pay scales for persons entering employment (Einstiegstarife) as well as of cuts in, 
or elimination of, yearly special payments (Bispinck 2001, Bispinck and Schulten 
2003). They are used more often in East Germany than in West Germany. In East 
Germany, in settling questions of remuneration the works councils bring in the trade 
unions much less often than in West Germany (Artus 2001, pp. 129 – 30; Artus, 
Schmidt and Sterkel 2000). 
 
In addition to these legal ways there are also illegal forms of contractual flexibilisation. 
Measures of flexibilisation settled at the plant level are illegal when works council and 
management come to an agreement permitting deviation from currently valid wage 
agreements without the involvement of the collective bargaining parties. This may take 
the form of an agreement at the plant level (Betriebsvereinbarung) or a regulatory 
agreement  (Regelungsabrede). No information is available concerning the extent or 
frequency of such agreements. 
 
Contractual ‘opt-out clauses’ are often the basis for “alliances for employment” at the 
production unit level (betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit). But these alliances may 
include other forms of agreements, some of which are illegal as well. The basic idea 
underlying these alliances is a bartering arrangement: the employees make concessions 
with respect to remuneration and the employer promises to maintain a certain level of 
employment for a limited period of time (Seifert 2002). In the WSI survey for 2002, 29 
percent of works councils and 23 percent of personnel councils had internal agreements 
meant to ensure a given level of employment or the survival of the production unit or 
government office. The share of large production units (with more than 1000 
employees) having such arrangements is 46 percent and it is clearly higher than the 
average (Bispinck and Schulten 2003; Hassel and Rehder 2001). 
 
Apart from the contractual flexibilisation measures, breach of contract contributes to the 
internal erosion of the area-wide wage agreement as well. According to information 
collected from works councils in the WSI survey, in 2002 ten percent of production 
units occasionally failed to meet the standards established in collective wage 
agreements; five percent reported that they often failed to meet these standards. In East 
Germany, violations of the collective agreements occur more frequently than in West 
Germany. In enterprises owned by the state or in government authorities, collective 
agreements are in general observed (Bispinck and Schulten 2003). Bahnmüller (2002)   12
comes to similar conclusions in a survey of managers and members of works councils in 
production units subject to a collective wage agreement in the engineering industry, the 
textile and garment industry and the banking sector. His survey indicates that ten 
percent of the production units deviate considerably from the area-wide wage 
agreement. In 37 percent of the production units the deviations are considered to be 
insignificant, whilst 53 percent of the production units observe the agreement 
punctiliously. 
 
This internal erosion of collective wage agreements reinforces the external erosion in 
Germany. In 2002, we have seen that around 63 percent of West German employees and 
43 percent of their east German colleagues worked in a production unit that was subject 
to an area-wide wage agreement; seven respectively twelve percent worked in 
production units that had company-wide collective wage agreements. It is, however, not 
possible to give precise figures regarding the proportion of employees that are paid 
below the scales agreed upon in these agreements, since representative figures showing 
the extent of internal erosion of area-wide agreements are not available. The WSI 
surveys indicate, however, that the cases of remuneration falling short of the norms 
established in collective agreements are not negligible. On the other hand, the influence 
of collective wage agreements goes beyond the area in which they are in a formal sense 
binding. The remuneration of labour in production units not subject to such agreements 
is in many cases nonetheless influenced by union pay scale. Results for 2002 obtained 
from the panel of the Institute for Employment Research show that 30 percent of 
employees in West Germany and 45 percent in East Germany are not covered by a 
collective wage agreement. However, in both parts of the country more than half of 
these employees are covered indirectly by a collective wage agreement, since the 
production unit where they work fixes remuneration according to union scales (Kohaut 
and Schnabel 2003). 
 
 
5.  The Macroeconomic Connection Between the Degree of Centralisation 
of Wage Bargaining and Employment 
 
The wage bargaining system must fulfil three criteria in order to make a positive 
contribution to employment. The system should ensure that when full employment 
prevails, the wage increases are in line with macroeconomic productivity developments. 
If there is less than full employment, then wage increases should lie below productivity 
increases. In addition, the system of wage negotiation should permit sufficient wage   13
flexibility so that the economy can respond appropriately to macroeconomic shocks. 
Furthermore, the system should make possible wage differentials that correspond to 
market conditions. And finally, the system of wage negotiations should function in such 
a way that employees are encouraged to perform optimally.  
 
The degree of centralisation of wage bargaining exercises its influences on the 
development of labour remuneration principally through two mechanisms: the 
internalisation of external wage effects and the exploitation of market power (Calmfors 
et al. 2001; Berthold and Fehn 1996). The corporatist thesis is based entirely on 
internalisation effects. Collective bargaining parties that have a central frame of 
reference, i.e. that see the wage determination problem in a macroeconomic context, 
will be more likely to take into account the macroeconomic implications of wage 
negotiations and hence will tend to moderate wage settlements. The more decentralised 
the wage negotiations are, the less wage externalities will be internalised. In this view, 
the straight line marked I in figure 2 sketches the relationship between degree of 
centralisation and moderation of wage settlements.  
 
The hump-shape thesis developed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) takes into account 
not only the internalisation effects, but also the differences in the possibilities of price 
setting that are connected with wage increases. The individual production unit has little 
room to pass on wage increases to its customers in the form of price increases, since the 
high elasticity of substitution on the demand side between its own products and those of 
its competitors means that price increases for its products will result in a falling off in 
the demand for its output. At the level of the entire branch, however, the possibility to 
pass on wage increases is greater, since all competing enterprises are affected equally by 
the wage increase, and customers cannot so easily shift their demand to other branches 
(the elasticity of substitution between the products of different branches being low). At 
the macroeconomic level, the negative effects of excessive wage increases cannot be 
passed on to others (figure 2).  
 
Many comparative empirical studies come to the conclusion that a high degree of 
centralisation of wage bargaining (with its high degree of horizontal coordination) leads 
to a greater moderation in the development of the real wage level than decentralised 
wage negotiations with scant coordination (Calmfors et al. 2001).
2 The comparison of a 
                                                 
2 For Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nicoletti et al. (2001), the superiority of highly centralised wage 
bargaining systems is not based on moderate wage increases resulting from them, but rather on the 
greater wage flexibility as compared to systems with less coordination. In their view, coordinated wage   14
system with intermediate centralisation with a system of scant centralisation does not, 
however, give such clear cut results. If internalisation mechanisms are the primary 
influence at work, then decentralisation will lead to higher increases in wages. If, on the 
other hand, the mechanisms underlying the hump-shaped curve are dominant, then the 
decentralisation will result in a decrease in the growth of real wages. 
 
Figure 2: 





















II Hump  shape 
 
 
The relationship between the degree of centralisation and wage developments presented 
here is the "classical" concept, which for a number of reasons has been called into 
question in recent years. Traxler (2003) accepts the superiority of centralised bargaining 
systems only with qualifications. In his view, in evaluating systems of wage 
negotiations the coordination of wage negotiations must be taken into account along 
with the degree of centralisation. According to Traxler, centralised wage negotiations 
are advantageous only when the state takes measures that ensure that settlements made 
at the centralised level are accepted by the members of the collective bargaining parties 
                                                                                                                                               
negotiations are able to react appropriately to macroeconomic shocks and are thus better able to prevent 
unemployment from increasing 
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at lower levels (vertical coordination). Otherwise, there is the risk that wage increases at 
the level of the individual firm will run counter to the macroeconomic coordination of 
wage developments.  
 
In addition, the coordination form of pattern bargaining must also be considered in 
evaluating systems of wage negotiations with a medium degree of centralisation. Pattern 
bargaining is the most important single element of the German system of wage 
negotiations. In almost all regions and branches, the wage agreements are to a greater or 
lesser degree oriented to the wage agreements reached in the mental-working industry in 
North Württemberg and North Baden where extremely profitable enterprises are 
located. This results in a tendency for wage agreements in economically weaker regions 
to be “excessive”.  In order to represent the full effect of this tendency graphically, the 
hump-shaped curve in figure 2 would have to show greater kurtosis.   
 
The hump-shape thesis, according to which area-wide collective wage agreements are 
inferior to company-wide collective agreements with respect to wage moderation has, 
however, been questioned by Fitzenberger and Franz (1999). In their view, the 
determination of the optimal degree of centralisation must also take into account the 
insider-outsider problem. They suggest that insider behaviour is particularly important 
at the level of the production unit, since the influence of the jobholders (especially those 
with higher qualifications) is stronger there than at the level of the trade union 
organisation. This implies that decentralised wage negotiations would for that reason 
not lead to more moderate wage settlements if compared to more centralised 
negotiations. 
 
Wage bargaining systems cannot be evaluated without considering the interaction with 
other areas of state decision making. As soon as these are taken into consideration, 
conclusions may be inverted, and decentralised negotiations may turn out to be more 
advantageous. For example, Iversen (1999) has been able to show that, in conjunction 
with a medium degree of centralisation of wage negotiations, monetary policy oriented 
to defending price stability will lead to a considerable reduction in unemployment, 
while in conjunction with a high degree of centralisation it will on the contrary act to 
increase unemployment. 
 
Theoretical and empirical research shows that a majority of macroeconomists holds the 
opinion that a high degree of centralisation in wage negotiations brings about the most 
advantageous wage and employment development from a macroeconomic point of 
view. However, a number of liberal economists challenge this opinion. They argue that   16
centralised wage negotiations tend to off-set market forces in the labour market, 
traditional wage agreements being thought of as a sort of cartel arrangement. As a 
consequence, wage rates agreed upon are higher than the rates that would clear the 
labour market. Furthermore, the structure of wage rates agreed upon in such agreements 
would show a higher degree of compression than would be the case in competitive 
markets (Möschel 1996; Siebert 1997).  
 
 
6.  Wage Bargaining Systems as Seen by the Production Unit 
 
In the preceding section, wage bargaining systems with different degrees of 
centralisation were examined with respect to their macroeconomic effects. But the 
individual production unit (plant) will look at a bargaining system mainly in terms of 
how well the system fits to its economic needs. Today, a production unit must be 
competitive on an international level. Technical progress has led to the abandonment of 
the Taylor approach to the design of production processes which has been predominant 
for such a long time. New market conditions and different production processes require 
that the individual employee should take more responsibility and that he or she should 
be able to deal with a greater range of tasks (Lindbeck and Snower 2001). The 
formation of human capital that is specific to the firm is increasingly a decisive factor 
on which the success of an enterprise depends. 
 
Speaking in general terms it is very difficult for centralised wage bargaining to respond 
adequately to the specific requirements of individual production units. The bargaining 
parties are confronted with information problems. They are unable to evaluate 
sufficiently the situation of individual production units (Freeman and Gibbons 1993). 
What is more, collective wage agreements are usually standardised and are not capable 
of rewarding individual performance adequately. This increases the risk that labour 
performance will remain under the attainable level. Furthermore, the wage agreements 
may undermine the incentives for the individual employees to develop their human 
capital. Wage determination at the production unit level is better suited to solve the 
problems relating to  asymmetric information and incentives. Wage agreements at the 
production unit level can take into consideration the economic situation of the unit and 
the ability of the employees; such agreements can be designed to meet the problems and 
the requirements that are specific to a particular unit. 
 
In the context of the German wage bargaining system, it is, however, in large measure 
already possible for the production unit to remunerate, adequately and individually,   17
employees who take on more demanding tasks or accumulate human capital that is 
specific to the firm. Collective wage agreements only establish minimum conditions and 
there is no reason why enterprises should not pay above these minimum requirements 
(principle of advantage).  
Although decentralised wage negotiations offer the advantages of greater flexibility, 
they also entail problems. Bargaining gives rise to transaction costs. Wage contracts 
agreed upon in centralised wage negotiations reduce these transaction costs, particularly 
for production units with a relative homogenous staff or with standardised working 
conditions. Moreover, if centralised wage negotiations bring about uniform conditions 
throughout a particular branch, this tends to reduce the mobility of labour between 
production units, since wage differentials will be reduced, thus diminishing turnover 
costs. 
 
A further disadvantage of wage bargaining at the plant level is that it shifts the conflicts 
related to bargaining down to the production unit level; this can lead to losses in 
productivity. As well, decentralised wage negotiations generally increase the frequency 
of strikes. This is related to the fact that when compared to the management, the 
employees of an enterprise are usually less able to assess the economic situation of the 
enterprise. As a consequence they tend to overestimate the scope for wage increases. 
Management is inclined to represent the economic situation in an unfavourable light, 
and since the employees will be aware of this, they will be tempted to resort to a strike 
in order to determine their employer’s true willingness to accept a settlement and to 
impose the corresponding wage increases. In centralised wage negotiations, the trade 
union and the employers association have approximately the same information basis 
with respect to macroeconomic developments, and a strike as an information revealing 
device is less likely to be employed. 
 
Whilst from a macroeconomic point of view central (i.e. highly coordinated) wage 
bargaining appears to be more advantageous, from a microeconomic point of view there 
is much to be said in favour of wage negotiations at the level of the production unit or 
for individual agreements between employer and employee. (Both positions are, 
however, controversial.) The German system seeks to combine wage negotiations with a 
medium degree of centralisation (pattern bargaining) with decentral elements 
(company-wide collective wage agreements, contractual ‘opt-out clauses’ opening the 
way for agreements at the plant level, individual agreements between employer and 
employee). In this way it attempts to further income distribution objectives whilst at the 
same time it seeks to take advantage of coordination advantages and also to provide the 
flexibility needed by individual business enterprises or plants. The empirical studies   18




7.   Collective Agreements and Wages in Germany  
 
Up till now, the influence of collective wage agreements on wage levels and on 
productivity has scarcely been studied empirically for Germany. The studies done by 
Pfeiffer (2003), the survey of enterprises carried out by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung [ZEW]) (Franz et 
al. 2000)  and the surveys of works councils and personnel councils of the WSI 
(Bispinck and Schulten 2003) are exceptions to this statement. In addition, there are a 
few further studies on selected aspects of the subject. Pfeiffer examines the extent to 
which wage rigidity exists and whether existing rigidities are the result of union scales 
or whether they have been accepted by enterprises in the interest of ensuring efficiency. 
His study is based on wage data obtained from the employment sample of the Institute 
for Employment Research in the period 1975 to 1995. The ZEW survey is based on a 
survey of 801 enterprises in industry and services which was carried out in the spring of 
2000. The survey sought to determine the reasons for insufficient flexibility of 
remuneration. The survey of works and personnel councils carried out by the WSI 
amongst other things was meant to assess the shifting of wage bargaining to the 
production units by the members of these councils. 
 
For Pfeiffer, wage rigidity exists when in comparison to a state defined as being flexible 
(i.e., wage determination under competition) wages cannot fall. They can either not 
decline because of union scales that have been agreed upon (rigidity of contractual 
scales). Or they cannot fall in nominal terms because of other reasons (rigidity of 
nominal wages). An example may clarify the method employed. Suppose that the 
personal and the employment characteristics of employees A and B are similar. If the 
actual change in A’s pay during a given period corresponds exactly to the rise in the 
relevant union scales, and if the actual change in B’s pay (under competitive conditions) 
is less than the rise in the union scales in the same period, then there is rigidity because 
of union scales. If A’s pay does not change during the period under review, whilst B’s 
pay (under competitive conditions) declines, then there is rigidity of nominal wages. In 
order to determine the number of employees whose pay exhibits rigidity, the yearly 
variations in pay between employees are compared. The extent of wage rigidity is 
calculated from the changes in pay experienced by more than two million employees. 
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For the period 1975 – 1995, Pfeiffer comes to the conclusion that in West Germany 
wage rigidities have protected about half of the employees either from wage changes 
that would have been less than the changes in the union scales that were agreed upon, or 
from nominal wage losses. (For the other half of the employees, their wages were 
variable.) Rigidities in union scales have been quantitatively more important than 
rigidities in nominal wages.
3 During the period 1975 to 1990 the real wage level was on 
average six percent higher than it otherwise would have been if nominal wage rigidities 
had not been present. This effect may be referred to as a bloating of the wage level, and 
one must suppose that it has contributed to dampening the dynamics of employment in 
Germany. At the same time, one should take into account that induced productivity 
improvements are a partially compensating factor. 
 
The importance of rigidity in contractual scales and of rigidity in nominal wages 
depends on the qualifications of the employees. The ZEW survey indicates that in the 
case of employees with low levels of qualifications, the main cause of inflexible 
remuneration is binding collective wage agreements, but implicit wage contracts also 
have an effect. With respect to the group of employees with high qualifications, the 
enterprise must take into account the costs of recruiting labour as well as the costs 
associated with the loss of human capital that will result if wages are reduced and, as a 
consequence, employees find employment elsewhere. In particular, the risk of losing 
one’s best employees to other firms, and the resulting costs of recruiting and training 
new candidates, the loss of human capital that inevitably occurs when employees with 
long years of experience leave the production unit and finally the negative signalling 
effect that is sent out by lower pay rates with respect to recruiting new employees are 
emphasised as negative side effects of pay reductions (Franz et al. 2000). 
 
In connection with the wage rigidity that is related to collective wage agreements in 
general, the question arises whether union wage scales that are agreed upon in 
company-wide collective wage agreements tend to be lower than union scales that come 
about as a result of area-wide collective wage agreements. According to Meyer (1992) 
this is not the case; Pfeiffer (2003, p. 151) comes to the conclusion that this is only 
exceptionally the case. Based on their theoretical analysis as well as simulations, 
Fitzenberger and Franz (1999) conclude that taking the insider-outsider problem into 
                                                 
3    Beissinger and Koppik (2003) have reviewed studies based on surveys, on experimental studies and 
microeconometric studies in a number of countries.  In contrast to Pfeiffer, they come to the 
conclusion that downward rigidities of nominal wages are not the result of institutional arrangements, 
but rather of psychological factors. They argue that in the Anglo-Saxon countries there is a downward 
nominal wage rigidity that is comparable to continental European countries, although union density is 
much lower as is collective bargaining coverage.          20
account, there is no clear ordinal difference between collective wage negotiations at the 
level of the firm and negotiations at the branch level. Even contractual ‘opt-out clauses’ 
and the agreements at the plant unit level that are based on such clauses would not 
necessarily lead to lower wages (Pfeiffer 2003, p. 157). 
 
In comparing area-wide collective wage agreements with company-wide collective 
wage agreements and agreements at the plant level, it must be borne in mind that works 
councils, who are the main actors involved in the shift of wage bargaining to the 
production unit, are quite sceptical about the resulting increase in their tasks and 
responsibilities. The WSI survey (2002) shows that only fourteen percent of those 
surveyed welcomed this change, 38 percent were ambivalent, and 42 percent responded 
that they considered this shift to be in general problematic. There is concern that the 
decentralisation of wage bargaining will disturb the balance of power in favour of 
employers, that within a particular bargaining area, wages will drift apart, and that 
works councils will be confronted with problems that are beyond their power to solve 
(Bispinck and Schulten 2003). Wage agreements that are considered to be unfair and the 
introduction of distributional conflicts in the production units can have a negative affect 
on employees. The absorption of works councils in wage negotiations will reduce their 
possibilities to collaborate in measures designed to improve productivity (Hübler and 
Jirjahn 2001). 
 
Company-wide collective wage negotiations and agreements at the plant level (based on 
contractual ‘opt-out clauses’) do not result in more moderate wage contracts than 
negotiations at the branch level. At the same time, Pfeiffer’s study indicates that 
individual wage negotiations do lead to more moderate wage developments. Over all, 
wages negotiated individually are lower than those agreed upon in collective 
negotiations. It is too early to assess whether free competition in determining wage rates 
provides favourable incentives for performance, or whether it rather tends to reduce 
workers’ motivation and willingness to perform optimally, since the effects of free wage 
agreements on performance and motivation have not yet been studied. 
 
 
8.  Proposals for a Further Decentralisation of  Wage Bargaining 
 
In the German debate two major steps for a further decentralisation of wage bargaining 
have been proposed. These steps would have the effect of cutting back the influence of 
trade unions in the process of wage determination. One idea is that individual wage 
negotiations should have greater importance than is today the case. Wage competition at   21
the level of the individual production unit or the individual worker should be 
strengthened by abolishing the freedom of collective bargaining guaranteed in the 
German Constitution. On the one hand, the realisation of this proposal would result in a 
reduction in wage bloating, but at the same time it would be accompanied by an 
increase in transaction costs, a loss of services provided by associations, a decrease of 
countervailing power of trade unions etc. The abolition of the freedom of collective 
bargaining would require a two-thirds majority in the German parliament and it would 
be difficult to obtain the broad base support such a majority requires; in particular, one 
would have to expect considerable resistance on the part of employees enjoying an 
insider position. 
 
A second way to broaden the area of individual wage negotiations is for enterprises to 
leave employers associations. This is already taking place. However, trade unions’ 
power and employees’ militancy will set limits to this process. Wherever union density 
and the militancy of union members are high, the enterprise runs the risk of conflicts 
which will represent a disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors without labour relations 
problems. Under such circumstances employers will prefer to stay in (or re-enter) the 
employers association and stick to the area-wide wage agreement. In this way, the 
individual enterprise is protected against measures arising from labour conflicts that 
affect it alone. 
 
A third way to extend the range of individual wage agreements is for  government to 
make use of its statutory authority. It could contribute to the reduction of collective 
bargaining coverage by abolishing extension laws, or at least by making the legal 
requirements for such extensions more restrictive, for example by defining under what 
conditions there is a “public interest” (§ 5, sect. 1 of the Collective Agreement Act) in 
extending collective agreements. In addition, the length of time in which the old wage 
agreement is still binding after the employer has left the employers association could be 
reduced.
4  These changes in the institutional framework of wage determination  are 
advisable. 
 
                                                 
4    A reduction in the legally binding force of wage agreements could be brought about if the principle of 
advantage would be given a different interpretation by the legislature and the courts. Under the 
currently valid interpretation, this principle forbids deviations from the collective wage agreement 
when wage concessions are proposed in return for greater job security, for instance in the form of a 
commitment by the employer to refrain from redundancies based on the general economic situation of 
the production unit. It is a matter of controversy whether it is desirable and legally admissible to 
introduce considerations of job security in applying the principle of advantage in specific cases (cf. the 
annual report of the Council of Economic Advisors, 2002/2003, §§ 467 and 468).     22
In addition to broadening the area of individual wage negotiations there are calls for 
trade union influence to be curtailed by enacting legal provisions which make possible 
wage agreements at the production unit level; the proposal is to provide a legal basis for 
this by means of statutory “opt-out clauses”. Most of the proposals along these lines 
suggest that a quorum should be the precondition for making use of such a clause, 
requiring the approval of the management of the enterprise, a majority of votes under 
the employees and – in some proposals – also agreement of the works council. In 
addition, the possibilities for agreements at the plant level with employers who are not 
subject to area-wide wage agreements should be liberalised, which requires a change in 
§77, sect. 3 of the Industrial Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) concerning 
the  restrictions on possible agreements relating to wages and conditions of work etc. 
(modification of the barrier to regulatory activity). 
 
Statutory ‘opt-out clauses’ as well as the modification of the Industrial Constitution Act 
will in all likelihood meet with objections based on constitutional law. For one thing, 
such clauses interfere with the freedom of collective wage bargaining. They also 
undermine the freedom of choice of the individual (and hence the basic right to private 
autonomy) with respect to the right to negotiate his or her remuneration with the 
employer. This autonomy is impaired by the fact that organisations without legitimation 
(management of the enterprise/works councils) conclude wage agreements that are 
binding on the individual. Limitation of the freedom of collective wage bargaining 
would, however, seem to be justified under certain circumstances, when other basic 
rights such as the right to work (in a situation of mass unemployment) are affected. In 
weighting the different types of violations of basic rights, agreements at the plant level 
which contain wage schedules for newly hired employees who were formerly long-term 
unemployed or wage reductions as a measure to save jobs in a production unit 
threatened by insolvency are considered legally permissible (Möschel 2003).
5 
 
If there is a shift in favour of agreements at the plant level, then on the one hand wage 
determination will be made more flexible. On the other hand, the system of area-wide 
collective wage agreements will be undermined. As more and more enterprises enter 
into agreements at the plant level, the pressure on other enterprises to follow suit will 
become greater. The balance of the dual system of wage bargaining would be put at 
                                                 
5   In view of the reservations based on considerations of constitutional law that have been formulated 
with respect to binding wage agreements at the plant level that are grounded in statutory ‘opt-out 
clauses’, Möschel (2003) proposes that the employees in such a production unit be asked individually 
to accept as binding the model agreements that have been worked out by the management and the 
works council. At the same time, the employer should have under certain circumstances, the right to 
give notice to an employee who refuses to accept the model agreement.   23
risk. The decentralisation of wage bargaining would also mean that coordination 
resulting from pattern bargaining would be abolished; this type of coordination has 
contributed up till now to a reduction of wage competition between production units and 
to a greater degree of social peace, as expressed in fewer strikes. In the future, it would 
be possible that wage competition between enterprises will become more intense as a 
result of the changes in the  institutional conditions. In the service of reducing wage 
rigidities, this would be entirely desirable, but on the other hand it could lead to more 
frequent strikes. The traditional mechanisms of coordination would no longer be able to 
make the same contribution to maintaining social peace; business enterprises would 
have to assume responsibility for this task (Hassel and Rehder 2001; Streeck and 
Rehder 2003). 
 
A statutory decentralisation of wage bargaining would bring about more moderate wage 
agreements compared to agreements where unions are involved. However, the wage 
agreements emerging from such bargaining will in all likelihood not be moderate 
enough to bring about a sustained reduction in unemployment. There are two reasons 
for this. One is that the Constitution sets limits to this form of decentralisation of wage 
bargaining. The other is that most of the available evidence indicates that agreements at 
the production unit level do not generally lead to more moderate wage agreements, 
although it must be noted that up till now information is limited to agreements that have 
come about as a result of contractual 'opt-out clauses'.  
 
Since the extension of individual wage agreements is debatable and runs up against 
limits, and since the acceptance of plant level agreements on the basis of statutory “opt-
out clauses” represents risks, one could consider other measures to ensure that the 
collective bargaining parties reach more moderate agreements and greater wage 
dispersion. A more binding obligation to support the attainment of social objectives 
such as high levels of employment could be imposed on the collective bargaining 
parties. This could follow the pattern of the Netherlands, where a foundation (“Stichting 
van de Arbeid”) prepares wage negotiations and points out the labour market 
consequences of imminent wage agreements. It would also make sense to broaden the 
spectrum of issues dealt with in collective negotiations; in this way the importance of 
distributional conflict might be reduced and their solution could be made easier (Streeck 
1998). 
 
Wage agreements providing for moderate wage increases could also be attained by 
weakening the power of insiders, e.g. by reforming employment protection laws. 
Furthermore, the narrowing of the wedge which the high social security contributions   24
drive between gross wages and net earnings could contribute to employees’ willingness 
to accept agreements which provide only a moderate increase in gross wages (Franz 
2002). An increase in women’s participation in gainful employment would have the 
same effect, since if there are two earners in a household, this makes it easier to 
renounce wage increases. Then too, more wage disparity could be sought for. This 
could be brought about by reducing the level and the duration of entitlement of social 
benefits so as to reduce the reservation wage rates. The positive effect on employment 
and the social tolerance of such measures could be enhanced if they are accompanied by 
wage tax credits for employees in low wage groups (Sinn et al. 2002). 
 
 
9.  Summary 
 
The area-wide collective wage agreement is at the centre of the German system of wage 
bargaining. In recent years, however, there has been some decentralisation of wage 
bargaining. The area-wide agreement has declined in importance and wage agreements 
at lower, i.e. more decentralised, levels (company-wide collective wage agreements, 
agreements at the plant level, individual wage contracts) have correspondingly gained 
ground. 
 
Empirical studies indicate that the decentralisation of collective wage bargaining 
(company-wide collective agreements instead of area-wide agreements) has up till now 
not led to more moderate wage agreements. The same applies with respect to 
agreements at the plant level (based on contractual ‘opt-out clauses’) vis-à-vis area-wide 
collective agreements, although wage flexibility has been increased. In contrast, in 
individual wage agreements lower wages are agreed upon than in collective agreements. 
Collective agreements serve in particular to protect less qualified employees against a 
deterioration in their wages. There is no information permitting a conclusion with 
respect to whether free wage competition leads to more favourable incentives to 
employees' performance. 
 
In Germany, the freedom of collective wage bargaining guaranteed in the Constitution 
is an obstacle to reinforcing individual wage determination, as is the readiness of 
employees to defend the system of collective wage negotiations. Some of the legal 
obstacles that stand in the way of reducing collective bargaining coverage could, 
however, be removed. A statutory decentralisation of wage bargaining through 
agreements at the plant level most probably would bring about a minor moderation in 
wage developments and an increase in wage flexibility. However, objections on   25
constitutional and socio-economic grounds arise and, hence, there are limitations to the 
spread of this form of decentralisation. In any case, a further flexibilisation of the 
system of area-wide wage agreements is desirable, without putting the dual system of 
wage bargaining at risk. In addition, other complementary labour market institutions 
and the social security system should be reformed in order to reach more moderate wage 
agreements and a greater wage dispersion.    26
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